Historical information on the population

The need for population statistics is central to any form of planning. Without knowing who the planning is for, their numbers and characteristics particularly in terms of age, sex and nationality, as well as understanding the capability of the private and public institutions to provide for them, it is impossible to form sensible policies with regard to land uses, transport systems and their disposition and rates of development. Certain issues are common to all countries, but the Gulf states have characteristics which differentiate them from many other parts of the world. In particular, the relatively young population, the high proportion of males and the number of ex-patriates comprising the majority of the population need careful consideration if they are to be catered for effectively.

Two organisations have a particular responsibility for planning the State of Qatar. The Planning Council, which was established on the 6th June 1998, and has the responsibility for:

• preparing economic and social policies and plans in line with the principles and guidelines specified by the basic statute of the State, and following up the implementation of these policies and plans after they have been ratified by the Council of Ministers,
• expressing its views in the form of recommendations submitted to the Council of Ministers following their ratification by H.H. the Emir, and
• submitting a detailed annual report to the Emir on various projects included in the State֜s economic and social plan, explaining the extent and scope of success and achievements, and making recommendations resolving any difficulties.

and the Central Statistics Office, established in the 1980s.

The Planning Council is responsible for the strategic planning of the State, though its recommendations have to be approved by the Council of Ministers and H.H. the Emir. Their remit appears to concentrate on the operations and organisation of government structures, together with the coordination of information systems.

The Central Statistics Office is the central organisation for development and collation of the statistics that used to be the resonsibility of different Ministries. As such it has a pivotal rôle in the production of accurate figures on which the State can make decisions. One of the most important of these areas is that of population which has often been a little difficult to establish.

Early settlement

Badu have used the Qatar peninsula for centuries, taking advantage of the sparse resources there to feed themselves and their families while maintaining their territorial interests with regard to other families in Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. This area should be read in conjunction with this in order to obtain a broader understanding. There may be minor inconsistencies…

Culturally, Qatar is related to the southern part of the Arabian/Persian Gulf and its adjoining mainland. For many centuries there seems to have been no real settlement in the peninsula though, by the end of the nineteenth century there were littoral settlements inhabited in the main by Arabs and immigrants from Persia, but little or nothing in the interior. This was the province of the badu tribes.

Although many of the badu tribes are now settled, there is still some movement. Incidentally, I should mention that the term badu is generally used to refer to those who are not settled. This is an increasing problem with regard to nationality which is discussed a little further here.

There have been two main groups of badu tribes using the Qatar peninsula:

• a group which moves in and out of the peninsula – the Bani Hajir, Al Manasir, Al Murrah, Al Awamir and Al ’Ajman, and
• one which moves within a relatively small part of the peninsula, the Al Na’im and, to a lesser extent, the Al Ka’aban.

The reason for this is historical, having to do with tribes and their inter-relationships.

The Bani Hajir

The Bani Hajir were the main badu group living in the eastern region of Saudi Arabia and their pattern of movement seems to have been governed both by their wide territorial interests as well as by the need to move relatively frequently.

The Al Manasir

The Al Manasir lived in the region covering the area between the south of the Qatar peninsula and the Buraimi oasis in what is now the United Arab Emirates. The Al Manasir were neighbours of both the Bani Hajir and Al Murrah and based themselves in the Liwah oasis – between the Buraimi oasis and the Qatar peninsula – in summer, and the Qatar peninsula in winter.

The Al Murrah

Further inland from the Qatar peninsula was the area used by the Al Murrah who inhabited the south part of the Al Hasa district, and who lived deeper into the Saudi peninsula than the Bani Hajir.

The Al Awamir

The Al Awamir were a tribe living in the area between the Oman and towards the Rub’a al Khali, south of the Liwa oasis.

The Al Ajman

I should also mention the Al Ajman, a tribe living in Al Hasa in the area north and west of the Bani Hajir and who were occasional visitors to the Qatar peninsula.

The Al Na’im

By the mid eighteenth century the main settlements in Qatar were those associated with two tribes, the Al Thani and the Al Khalifah. Very crudely the Al Thani, settled at Al Doha and Al Wakrah, controlled the east side of the peninsula but the Al Khalifah, settled on Al Zubarah controlled the north-west, and the Al Na’im were associated with the Al Khalifah.

The Al Na’im were related to the The Al Na’im of Oman but left centuries previously at the invitation of the Al ’Utub, the tribe from which the Al Khalifah came. They settled in the Qatar peninsula, wintering on Qatar but, in summer, some of them moving to the north of Bahrain and some to near Al Doha.

With time the Al Na’im stayed on the Qatar peninsula all year though this was only after 1937 when there was a split in the tribe. The Al Ramzan who had sided with the Al Thanis remained on the peninsula and the Al Jabr, who sided with the Al Khalifa of Bahrain in their disagreement over Al Zubarah – but lost, emigrated via Bahrain to Al Hasa, eventually returning to their traditional grounds in the north-west of Qatar where they moved around during the year. In summer they stayed around their wells near the coast and, in winter, moved further inland to graze their animals.

With reference to many of the tribes it is interesting that some of their members still remember their tribal histories and harbour feelings that they should enjoy a more important place in the peninsula’s society than they feel they do. This, presumably, is one of the many issues which the ruling family must bear in mind in their dealings with individuals and the history and relationships each represents.

go to top of page

Qatar’s population

The population of Qatar, in common with most of its neighbours, was relatively small until the explosion caused by the development of oil and gas, and the accompanying immigration of expatriates in large numbers to service the activities associated with the development of those resources. In 1939 there was estimated to be a total population of about 28,000, which can be compared with the estimates made in 1908 by Lorimer of between 26,000 and 27,000 of whom 20,000 were nationals. The group accounting for much of this increase were thought to be of Persian origin. However, the Second World War with the concomitant regional instability and economic hardship saw the population reduce through the thirties and forties to about 16,000 by 1949.

Here, to the side, is a diagram showing the location of the main tribes who settled in the Qatar peninsula. It is based on the work of Lorimer and I have very much simplified the diagram in Ferdinand’s work on the badu of Qatar from which it is taken. The diagram illustrates the disposition of the main settled families, but bear in mind that the peninsula by this time was under the control of the Al Thani family who were settled in Rayyan, Doha and Wakrah.

It is significant that the main tribes are settled on the east of the peninsula, though with the exception of the north-west of the peninsula where Bahrein still had influence, and the east side of the peninsula which was more inaccessible by sea.

go to top of page

The inhabitants of Qatar

Tribe or community	Where found in Qatar – date	1908	1939
Aynayn (Al bu)	Wakrah	2000
Ali (Al bin)	Doha	1750	1750
Amamarah	Doha and Wakrah	200	200
Arabs of Nejd	Doha and Wakrah	500	500
Baharinah	Doha and Wakrah	500	500
Baqaqalah	Doha	50	50
Dawasir	Doha	150	150
Hamaydat	Lusail and Dhaayn	250	250
Huwalah	Doha and Wakrah	2000	2000
Khalayfat	Wakrah	850	850
Kibisah	Khor Hassan, Fuwayrat, Hadiyah and Sumaismah	700	700
Kawarah (Al bu)	Sumaismah, Dhaayan and Fuwayrat	2500	2500
Maadhid	Doha, Wakrah and Lusail	875	875
Madhahakah	Dhaayn	a few	a few
Mahanadah	Khor Shaqiq and Dhakhirah	2500	2500
Mananaah	Abu Dhaluf and Doha	400	400
Maqla (Al bin)	Wakrah	50	50
Musallam (Al)	Doha, Fuwayrat and Wakrah	40	40
Negroes (free)	Doha and Wakrah	2000	2000
Negroes (slaves, but not living in their masters’ houses)	Doha and Wakrah	4000	4000
Negroes (slaves living with their owners)	Are reckoned in this table to the tribe in which they are owned
Persians	Doha and Wakrah	425	5000
Sadah	Ruways and Doha	350	350
Sudan	Doha	400	400
Sulutah	Doha	3250	2500
Yas (Bani) of the Al bu Falasah and Qubaysat sections	Doha and Wakrah	125	125

Taken from The Creation of Qatar

By 1945 the population of Qatar had dropped to around 25,000, firstly in response to the finding of oil in Bahrein in 1932 and, secondly – and more particularly – as a direct result of the trade blockade imposed by Bahrein because of their dispute with Qatar’s Abdullah bin Qasim over the ownership of Zubarah on the Qatar mainland – land the Bahreinis claimed as theirs despite the decision of the British Government in 1865 confirming it as belonging to Qatar.

In 1971, immediately prior to Independence, a British Government assisted census was made in Qatar estimating that the total population was 120,000 of whom 42,000 were Qataris. This figure represented a percentage average increase of about 2.1% for the Qatari population and presumably represented a strongly increasing percentage as Qataris returned to the new wealth available in Qatar and the live births over death rates increased. The census was not published. A number of other estimates were made around this time giving a population of between 79,000 and 126,000 and there have been constant difficulties caused by there not being an accurate, published census usable in planning the development of the country.

A sample survey was made in 1982 by the Central Statistics Office and followed up in 1986 by a full census, though the number of Qataris was not disclosed. The published census figures gave the total population in 1986 as being 369,079 – a 200% increase in fifteen years. A 1990 estimate raised this slightly to 371,000 of whom 70,000 were nationals and, in July 1992, another estimate raised the figure to 484,387. These figures were obtained from the Library of Congress where more details can be found. There are two significant points to make: firstly that, due to the large number of expatriate workers in the country, there is a relatively high male population – about two thirds are male – and, secondly, the natural increase in population for 1989 calculated on births over deaths is 29.3 per 1,000, a high rate for a developing country.

It is evident from the foregoing that the population numbers are a little dubious, and that the rates of increase are difficult to calculate or, indeed, rely on. However, it has to be admitted that the figures come from different sources and there is no reason not to believe that the Central Statistics Office does not have a grasp on the correct figures, and that they are being used in planning for the future.

It is important to know how large the population is for the purposes of providing for them but, at the end of the nineteen eighties, the Qatari population – for whom a wider range of provisions are made – was not easy to calculate. Nor was it easy to see how the developing aspects of the region would have their affect upon the future total population of Qatar. Strategic planning was a problem.

Although a large number of expatriates left due to the economic difficulties the country faced following the drop in the price of oil, the CSO stated that the increasing Qatari population, together with a net increase in expatriates, continued to expand the overall population to something over 400,000 in mid-1989. If this was so then it was likely to be at the lower service areas of the population where individuals obtain a relatively low wage.

The American State Department estimates that Qatar had a population in 2002 of about 650,000, of whom 150,000 are Qatari nationals. This implies a growth of slightly less than 4.1% on the 1970 Census figure – a lower rate than any of the scenarios considered by the first planning team to begin the process of planning for the future of the State in the early seventies.

The Planning Council stated that the 1997 census enumerated a population of 522,000 and the 2004 census showed an increase to 744,000 giving an annual increase of 6% from 1997 to 2004, ascribed to the strong economic growth.

The population of Qatar is mostly urban nowadays. 88% of the population is urban with 84% of the population concentrated in Doha and Rayyan, the other two main towns being Al Wakrah and Umm Said, both of them to the south of Doha.

The 1986 census also gave a snapshot of the population profile showing that two-thirds of it was male and that the age breakdown was:

less than 15	15-29	30-44	45-59	over 60
27.8%	29.3%	32.3%	8.6%	2.0%

The General Secretariat for Development Planning has published the following, taken from the 1986 and 1997 Population and Housing Censuses:

	1986	1997	2004
Population
Population	369,000	522,000	744,000
Male	248,000	342,000
Female	121,000	180,000
Labour force	201,000	286,000
Male	181,000	246,000
Female	20,000	40,000
Social and vital statistics
Total registered live births	12,118	12,200	12,856
Male	6,186	6,261	6,564
Female	5,932	5,939	6,292
Total deaths	1,210	1,220	1,311
Male	831	855	896
Female	379	365	415
Natural increase	10,908	10,980	11,545
Marriages	2,194	2,351	2,550
Divorces	566	732	790

What is significant about the published statistics is that there is no breakdown between the national and expatriate populations, figures which are vital in their use to an effective planning system, though an area where there have been difficulties expressed throughout the Gulf.

The figures also contain eccentricities which might not be readily understood. For instance, the relatively low figures ascribed to marriages is likely to be because the majority of marriages will be between nationals or with a national as one of the partners.

more to be written…

go to top of page

Nationals

Qataris comprise the minority of the population in their own country and there have been suggested a number of national, strategic and economic reasons for them to increase their numbers. A projection of the 42,000 Qatari population given by the 1970 census at a net increase of 4.4% per annum, which is the figure used by the first planning team, would have given an indigenous population of approximately 99,371 in 1990, though the CSO would not confirm it at the time.

The Census figure for the total population in 2004 given above, 743,000, indicated an increase of over 6%. Bearing in mind that the Qatari increase is likely to be less than 4%, it can be seen that the level of ex-patriate development has been significantly higher than 6%, reflecting the spurt in economic activity in recent years. If this growth has been unplanned for in terms of the infrastructure, there will be significant problems with housing and other provisions to service the increasing ex-patriate community. Although this economic activity benefits nationals, it increases other socio-cultural pressures on them, an issue that will be discussed elsewhere.

This chart examines alternative Qatari populations brought about by different rates of growth which, in the early seventies, seemed a reasonable spread to the consultants brought in to plan the State for the first time. It now appears that the rates of growth – births less deaths – were over-estimated. I have included it for its historical interest and would be interested to have access to the figures which would indicate the correct projections.

Qatari population projections based on the 1970 Census and alternative growth factors

Year	4.10%	4.20%	4.30%	4.40%	4.50%	4.60%	4.70%
1970	42,000	42,000	42,000	42,000	42,000	42,000	42,000
1971	43,722	43,764	43,806	43,848	43,890	43,932	43,974
1972	45,515	45,602	45,690	45,777	45,865	45,953	46,041
1973	47,381	47,517	47,654	47,792	47,929	48,067	48,205
1974	49,323	49,513	49,703	49,894	50,086	50,278	50,470
1975	51,346	51,593	51,841	52,090	52,340	52,591	52,842
1976	53,451	53,760	54,070	54,382	54,695	55,010	55,326
1977	55,642	56,017	56,395	56,774	57,156	57,540	57,926
1978	57,924	58,370	58,820	59,273	59,728	60,187	60,649
1979	60,298	60,822	61,349	61,880	62,416	62,956	63,499
1980	62,771	63,376	63,987	64,603	65,225	65,852	66,484
1981	65,344	66,038	66,739	67,446	68,160	68,881	69,609
1982	68,023	68,812	69,608	70,413	71,227	72,049	72,880
1983	70,812	71,702	72,601	73,512	74,432	75,364	76,306
1984	73,716	74,713	75,723	76,746	77,782	78,830	79,892
1985	76,738	77,851	78,979	80,123	81,282	82,456	83,647
1986	79,884	81,121	82,376	83,648	84,940	86,249	87,578
1987	83,159	84,528	85,918	87,329	88,762	90,217	91,694
1988	86,569	88,078	89,612	91,171	92,756	94,367	96,004
1989	90,118	91,777	93,465	95,183	96,930	98,708	100,516
1990	93,813	95,632	97,484	99,371	101,292	103,248	105,241
1991	97,660	99,649	101,676	103,743	105,850	107,998	110,187
1992	101,664	103,834	106,048	108,308	110,613	112,966	115,366
1993	105,832	108,195	110,608	113,073	115,591	118,162	120,788
1994	110,171	112,739	115,365	118,049	120,793	123,598	126,465
1995	114,688	117,474	120,325	123,243	126,228	129,283	132,409
1996	119,390	122,408	125,499	128,666	131,909	135,230	138,632
1997	124,285	127,549	130,896	134,327	137,844	141,451	145,148
1998	129,381	132,906	136,524	140,237	144,047	147,957	151,969
1999	134,685	138,488	142,395	146,408	150,530	154,763	159,112
2000	140,207	144,305	148,518	152,850	157,303	161,882	166,590
2001	145,956	150,366	154,904	159,575	164,382	169,329	174,420
2002	151,940	156,681	161,565	166,596	171,779	177,118	182,618
2003	158,170	163,262	168,512	173,926	179,509	185,266	191,201
2004	164,655	170,119	175,758	181,579	187,587	193,788	200,187
2005	171,406	177,264	183,316	189,569	196,029	202,702	209,596
2006	178,433	184,709	191,198	197,910	204,850	212,026	219,447
2007	185,749	192,466	199,420	206,618	214,068	221,780	229,761
2008	193,365	200,550	207,995	215,709	223,701	231,981	240,560
2009	201,293	208,973	216,939	225,200	233,768	242,653	251,866

The CSO have, however, stated that they were estimating on the basis of a net increase of Qataris at a rate of 4.1% into the middle nineteen-nineties dropping to 3.9% by the turn of the century – the difficulty being that they would not state the date and figure from which this is projected. However, if it is assumed that the projections are made from 1970 on the basis of the British Government assisted census, and that the rate is reduced from 1993 to 2000 as they suggest, then the Qatari population at the end of the millenium was somewhere in the region of 138,850.

The percentages suggested by the CSO, although high, are in line with published figures for the area which suggested that Saudi Arabia’s and the Gulf States’ indigenous populations are rising at a rate of between three and four per cent per annum. The Royal family – the Al Thani qabila, of whom it is guessed that, in 1990, there would be about five per cent of the Qataris or 4,700 – are thought to have a higher rate of natural increase and above-average sized families, as well as a slight preponderance of females over males; but again there are no published figures to confirm this. I should add here that the American Library of Congress have suggested that the figure might have been 20,000 in the early 1990s, but it seems a very high figure.

Generally, the figures are disturbing in that they demonstrate rapid expansion as well as lack of consistency. Both conditions are extremely difficult to plan for. If the numbers of Qataris are assumed to be correct at 94,000 in 1990 then they will have been 80,000 at the time of the 1986 census, assuming the lower rate of a 4.1% of increase. If the CSO’s belief – that there was in 1989 a population of well over 400,000 – is correct, then it would not be unrealistic to assume a 1990 total population of at least, say, 406,000 – an increase since the census of 36,000. But 14,000 of this figure would be Qataris, leaving a net increase of at least 22,000 expatriates over the four year period during which there has been a significant downturn in the economic activity of the State. Admittedly the rate of increase of the expatriate population would be much lower than the rate up to 1986, but the fact that it is increasing at all is surprising.

To put the problems associated with population figures in some form of perspective, it is instructive to look at the potential expansion of Iran on the other side of the Gulf. The existing population is approximately 50 million which, if present trends continue, will increase to 140 million in thirty-three years time, the majority of whom will be Iranians. The concern of the Qataris as well as the other Arabs of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia can be readily appreciated.

In 2005 the Planning Council believed that the million mark will be met in 2017. It is difficult to make an assessment of future trends but the Kuwait-based Global Investment House believes that this will be met much earlier, the present increase in economic activity being the reason for this.

Statistics can be difficult to deal with as they can be made to demonstrate a variety of different trends and results, either accidentally or intentionally. The main issue with projections of the sort being debated relates to the basis for the calculations. Previous calculations were based on ranges of possibilities in order to try to reflect the different socio-economic growth strategies likely to produce change. One of the greatest problems lies with the State’s ability to exercise control on all the factors governing change. With the global economic factors now operating, there wil be significant factors outside the State’s control. These are complicated by the socio-political factors operating in the region.

A second issue is that the present economic activity is expansionist and, to some extent, feeds on itself, as it does in Dubai. The economy is not balanced and there is, as yet, no range of integrated activities other than construction that are sufficient for the country to operate a stable economy. This paper, or note, deals only with population, but it it necessary to look at the wider social factors that will influence the way the economy might be established – if, of course, there ever is to be a stable state. Many authorities believe in there being a continuum of instability, the State continually attempting to achieve an illusory, theoretical balance.

go to top of page

Expatriates

Foreigners form much of the workforce within the country and this is likely to be so for the foreseeable future. At its simplest, labour is brought in from a number of countries such as the Indian sub-continent, the Far East, Egypt and some Arab countries for short term contracts, middle management from the Indian sub-continent, Jordan, Egypt and Europe, and top management from a variety of Arabic countries and Europe and the United States.

If, as stated above, the numbers of expatriates are increasing, then it is likely to mean that it is expatriates fulfilling the roles generally of servants and maids, obtaining salaries in the region of Qrs.400 or $110 per month, who are coming into the country to service the domestic requirements of the indigenous and, to a minor extent, the expatriate populations. Incidentally, it is surprising how many expatriates suddenly find themselves financially able to hire expatriate servants – but I shall write about this on the society page.

go to top of page

View of future balance

The lack of a political balance within the Middle East generally, and the Gulf in particular, makes it difficult to foretell future populations within Qatar. The problems associated with the dramatic rise and fall of oil prices caused a great number of difficulties for the Gulf States in organising their economies to continue to perform as their early promise had suggested. The more serious ramifications of the West’s perceived interference in Arabic affairs has created instability that will take years to resolve if, in fact, it is possible to resolve it to the benefit of the majority of the inhabitants at all.

Events at the north of the Gulf have suggested that Kuwait will attempt to redevelop itself with a population of half that which it had prior to its invasion by Iraq. This reduction in population is likely to be at the expense of the Palestinians – both those who were born there and those who came later – as well as other Arab nationals who have made a home there. In addition it is believed that large numbers of the service population from other countries – particularly from the Indian sub-continent and the Far East – may be encouraged to leave throwing more of the burden of the work on the indigenous Kuwaiti population. It is anticipated that this will be resisted by those countries affected as there is a real need to receive the monies remitted by their nationals to support the national economies.

The issues relating to population groupings are many, revolving around social, religious, ethical, political and other areas of debate and decision. If Kuwait is to attempt to change itself radically then it is probable that the opportunity might be taken in other Gulf States, including Qatar, to take similar steps which will affect the size of its population.

Militating against this it is argued that there will be many factors, particularly those which will emanate from the national population who will wish to see their accommodation rented, their imports purchased, and a variety of services provided for them as well as the influence of the American base now established on Qatar.

There are two basic factors that require ex-patriates within the Gulf States: firstly, there is the need to obtain personnel with the skills that do not, at present, exist within the State and, secondly, there is the need to introduce personnel who will execute those tasks that the nationals are unwilling to carry out themselves. In this there is little difference between Qatar and many other States in the world. There is no ability for expatriates to settle in Qatar as this is actively discouraged. There are those who live in Qatar to carry out the work for which they are contracted; some are permitted to enter the country to visit their relations; there is a very small amount of tourism, and the only other visitors are those making ad hoc visits in connection with business.

Although it seems now to be changing, there has been an active policy to restrict long term residency of expatriates in Qatar, as in the other Gulf States, for some time as it is seen that ex-patriates are a drain on limited resources – resources that should be utilised for the benefit of the nationals. There is also a general political commitment to assist poor Islamic and other countries as well as provide a refuge for stateless persons. This has resulted in a series of policies to provide labour that varies from time to time in response to agreements made between Governments and attitudes within Qatar. Palestinians, for instance, comprise a resource of individuals whom it is not possible to repatriate and they form a long term core of educated personnel who require jobs in Qatar. As Qataris are generally being educated to middle management, professional levels and above, it is likely that the trend for services to be provided by foreigners will continue for decades, and that there will continue to be increasing conflicts between the indigenous and expatriate populations for the limited number of jobs available. This problem has been recognised in other Gulf States for some time and has led to a series of policies which will benefit the indigenous populations, or which will even disbenefit the expatriate populations in the region.

It is difficult to know what will happen in the future. The present Government has expanded the country dramatically and there is significant development taking place. Dubai, which does not have the oil and gas that Qatar has, is developing its tourist, sports and second homes industries with Qatar following suit, albeit on a more modest scale perhaps, in Qatar’s case, in an effort to spread the base on which income is derived as well as to create a different cross section of its society.

Development is proceeding rapidly. The United Development Company began the Pearl-Qatar project in 2004 and intends to complete it by 2009, the first phase being ready for occupancy in 2006. Covering 400 hectares of reclaimed land it is the largest existing international real estate venture and intends to offer investors freehold. The development comprises a variety of residential types, a total of eight hundred beds in a number of five-star hotels, marinas, schools and retail facilities. These two satellite photographs were taken of it in September 2004 and November 2005 respectively.

In December 2005, Qatari state company, Qatari Diar, announced a five billion Dollar housing project that will be the largest in Qatar. Lusail will cover 3,500 hectares, house around 200,000 people, and is scheduled for completion by 2010. It is planned to have two residential zones, commercial and leisure centres, two golf courses, hotels, hospitals and two ports, as well as an artificial lake. It is similar to the existing Pearl development in that it is aimed at foreign investors who would be allowed to lease property for a period of ninety-nine years, with an option to renew.

Qatar Diar and Pearl-Qatar both state that one of their aims is to produce a balanced community in their developments, albeit an up-market community. But there is always a problem with this type of determinism. There are two basic difficulties:

• that of producing an integrated community from scratch, and the
• character of the community planned.

It is widely recognised that communities work best when established over a long period of time and contain all those elements necessary for their effective socio-economic operation. Up-market developments of the type planned don’t naturally contain these elements, particularly with the heavy servicing required. Communities are generally accepted as being societies that have a considerable amount of internal communication. You would not anticipate this in a community established rapidly and whose make-up is governed by the ability to afford the residential units on offer and with the owners coming from many different countries.

It is also probable that the housing is likely to appeal to people who would not make permanent homes there, if this follows the experience of countries such as Dubai and Malta that have produced similar developments, and where the housing is considered to be an investment first, and a home second. Even when the housing is leased to enable owners to obtain a return on their investment, this produces communities that are never fully occupied. This reflects both on the character of the estates in terms of visible activity, as well as on their ability to survive economically as self-contained operations.

The character of the State is developing and changing, the policies it designs enabling this progress. But there is a feeling in the Gulf that there has to be a wider understanding of the problems created by the character of the disbalanced population as well as by the future socio-cultural aspirations and characteristics of the national population. You have to bear in mind that, generally, Qataris have significant disposable incomes nowadays and there is an increasingly aggressive advertising operation – both overt and covert – focussed on them. As an outsider it seems impossible to understand how these will develop bearing in mind the range of pressures brought about by the crudely defined extremes of fundamentalism on the one hand and the West’s influence on the other.

It must be assumed that the ad hoc policies which determine the numbers of ex-patriates within the country will continue to vary depending upon relatively short term circumstance. From the State’s point of view there is much to commend such a policy but, from the long term point of view – one that will establish the overall character of the State – there are additional problems related to the need to plan for the future within the constraints of the religio-political situation of the Arabian peninsula.

More to be written…