Issues of note in the region

A number of factors contribute to the pressures for change within Qatari society. They reflect, in the main, emerging difficulties common to many of the Arab States as well as developing socio-psychological issues. Most of the pressures are seen by Arab commentators to stem from interference by the West in Arab affairs, a misunderstanding in the West of Islam, and by an endemic conflict between modern Arab moraes – usually developed through contact with the West – and the life thought to be prescribed by the Quran. Within the Arab world there has always been a lively social debate carried out through the medium of the written and spoken word, a tradition which, during the Arab renaissance, produced many works of beauty and relevance in parallel with the advances in the sciences. Nowadays this debate is being seriously constrained by a number of individuals and organisations who are perceived to be repressing the free expression of social debate – particularly that of the printed word. Some writers now claim that the issues of religion, sex and politics are dangerous areas in which to express opinions.

Although it is generally argued that the West is responsible for a variety of problems, where this blame rests is difficult to pinpoint. There is the difficulty of comprehending the cultural background of the region both in the West as well as in the Gulf. It is a platitude that, at a general level, modernity appears to be equated with the close resemblance of habits, practices and institutions similar to those of the West: in other words, modernisation is synonymous with Westernisation. Observation suggests that younger generations do not have the same attitude to traditional values as their parents; and even the parents share the dilemma of how to benefit without losing their cultural values or, more important, how to deal with change while retaining those values. It is not clear how far this is generally understood, nor how those that govern the States understand the difficulties intrinsic in replicating Western institutions; though they are certainly aware of it. Many Muslims are aware of the dichotomy produced by development even if only from a reactive point of view; hence the rise of fundamentalism. In this reactive development lies the seeds of global conflict, this time a probable conflict between civilisations.

It is commonly thought by Western as well as Muslim architects – and others – trained in the West that new development is an improvement on old development. The theory seems to be that change is associated mainly with two factors: movement to towns and the introduction of air-conditioning. For instance Geoffrey King, an architectural commentator who I’ve quoted here, believes that:

…the adaptation is by no means perfect aesthetically – in that respect, traditional architecture was far more pleasing. Yet in the modern concrete building people are comfortably housed in terms that meet Saudi Arabia’s social and religious traditions and in accord with perceptions of an Islamic lifestyle. Women still retain privacy and houses are designed to achieve this: there is often a separate entrance for women and the men’s majlis is organised so that it gives no views into other parts of the house to the male visitor’.

Even though this quote relates to Saudi Arabia, the State’s traditional connections to its adjacent, littoral Gulf States suggests that the argument might apply similarly to Qatar. Yet new development in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States – contrary to King’s assertion – does not fulfil, in anything like a similar manner, the precepts of the older developments, nor are the buildings more effective in successfully containing the new social operations.

Change in this context is difficult to define as it means different things to different groups. Here it is taken to be a conscious desire to change from the old values to something else. From a Western perspective we tend to see change in the Gulf as a movement towards Western values and, perhaps a benefit to the peoples of the region. To some Arabs this is undoubtedly the case. Though to a majority change is certainly seen to be happening, but the influence of the West is heavily resented, representing as it does all that is seen to be harmful to a search for pan-arabism and, particularly, for a post-colonial identity free of the colonisers – the West in general, and the United States in particular.

Certainly many Arabs have taken an interest in the West and the tools by which the West has achieved its present status, but they are more than matched by those who believe there should be a return to the original Islamic values. The former were epitomised by the Egyptian writer and thinker Taha Hussein who believed that the Arabs should master European culture in order to progress themselves. The majority, epitomised by his contemporary, Hasan Al Banna – founder in 1926 of the militant Muslim Brotherhood – argued that, on the contrary, Arabs should reject such contacts and return to the pristine Islam that was the setting from which sprang their great and heroic past.

The interests of the West in the area involved measures that were unpopular both within the West and in the Arab countries affected by colonial interests. As is described elsewhere, many of the countries of the region in fact owe their present boundaries to the involvement and requirements of the West – particularly of Britain and France, and this basic focus for resentment has enabled many Arabs to concentrate their disquiet against the West. However, the West not only established the boundaries of the countries of the region, but they were also responsible for setting the tone of the administrations that would run the newly defined countries. To some extent they had a choice, but it was realised that there would be considerable difficulties if a radical approach was taken and an effort made to introduce democratic institutions and administrations together with the outlooks that would make them realistic and workable. Rather than set about this impossible task the West established boundaries and attempted to reinforce the existing system of tribal government setting the seeds for many of the problems that have emerged in the region today. The system whereby the strong take charge and hold power by force does not produce the democracies that the West would like to see in place.

The overriding problem here is the inability of the West to understand the basic concept of Islam and the way in which Muslims differ from – for the most part – Christians in the West in many of their conceptual and behavioural attitudes.

Essentially, it is imperative for the West to understand that Islam subjugates the person to the community – not in a pejorative sense, but as an essential characteristic of the religion – and it has to be borne in mind that Islam is a social code in complete contradistinction to Christianity. In Islam, the concepts ‘self’, ‘community,’ ‘brotherhood’ and ‘nation’ have very different meanings from our understanding of those words in the West. Jonathon Raban points out that the subjective self found in the West is conceptually alien to the manner in which individuals in Islam see themselves. He points out that Muslims define themselves not by the understanding of their inner thoughts and conceptualisations, but in their interaction with others in their society. He quotes Rosen, noting that:

the configuration of one’s bonds of obligation define who a person is… the self is not an artefact of interior construction but an unavoidably public act’.

To understand the manner in which Muslims behave in both their public and private physical realms, this relationship of the person to the society has to be understood in its complexity – and in its simplicity. Raban has a very strong metaphor of its strength:

The idea of the body is central here. On the website of Khilafah.com, a London-based magazine, Yusuf Patel writes: ‘The Islamic ummah is manifesting her deep feeling for a part of her body, which is in the process of being severed.’ It would be a great mistake to read this as mere metaphor or rhetorical flourish. Ummah is sometimes defined as the community, sometimes the nation, sometimes the body of Muslim believers around the globe, and it has a physical reality, without parallel in any other religion, that is nowhere better expressed than in the five daily times of prayer.
The observant believer turns to the Ka’aba in Mecca, which houses the great black meteorite said to be the remnant of the shrine given to Abraham by the angel Gabreel, and prostrates himself before Allah at fajr (sunrise), dthuhr (noon), asr (mid-afternoon), maghrab (sunset) and isha (night). These times are calculated to the nearest minute, according to the believer’s longitude and latitude, with the same astronomical precision required for sextant-navigation. Note that the crescent moon is the symbol of Islam for good reason: the Islamic calendar, with its dates for events like the hajj and ramadhan, is lunar, not solar. Prayer times are published in local newspapers and can be found online, and for believers far from the nearest masjid, an inexpensive adhaan clock can be programmed to do the job of the muwadhin. So, as the world turns, the entire ummah goes down on its knees in a never-ending wave of synchronised prayer, and the believers can be seen as the moving parts of a universal Islamic chronometer.

Muslims are very conscious of this continuum and of their relationship with other Muslims, not only those they know but also those at the other side of the world; they have an innate awareness of ummah. Although Jews and Christians are considered to be ‘people of the Book’ – a reference to their appearance in the Bible – Muslims know, absolutely, the primacy of their true religion and its governance over their lives.

go to top of page

Decisions, decisions…

One social factor stands out from the rest, and that is the manner in which the society is responding to change. Traditional Gulf societies are formed on a feudal principle of primus inter pares – first among equals. Families assume an order of precedence, and those within a family are similarly ordered. Decisions are based on shared values, traditional allegiances, religious requirements or guidance, and political judgement. The society is not pluralist and depends to a large extent upon its received history – usually a function of the older members of the families to record, process and pass on when and as needed.

Today the structures of government which have been adopted from the West conflict with the traditional ways of making decisions. The majlis system is conceptually different from Western systems which bring together, for example, ministers to decide on their requirements. In particular government establishes another power base – differently structured from the majlis system – which an individual would normally be anticipated to organise to his own advantage. Although this follows the established system rewarding faithful and successful supporters of a leader, there is considerable room for misunderstanding. In the past those who had been rewarded were permitted to operate with some degree of impunity, provided that the leader was not embarrassed and continued to receive what was required. The new systems of government require more openness, inspection and, particularly, integration. In many ways these are inimical to the traditional system of government and are the cause of much misunderstanding and resentment.

The fact that these systems are supposed to be similar to the democratic models of the West reflects both the West’s requirements that others organise themselves as they do, as well as the desire by some elements of Arab society to take Western models as a way of developing their own interests, a trend which suggests an interest in control and management as a normal political function.

go to top of page

Religious

There are strong populist demands for change within the region. Bahrain, for instance, is under pressure from within its strong shi’ite community, and this has been reflected in the closing of the National Assembly, continuing unrest on the streets, the arrest of many considered to be potential trouble to the State and the expulsion of others in defiance of United Nations policies. Recent voting – late 2006 – has seen a radical shi’ite group gaining sixteen of the forty seats in parliament with the concomitant expressions of concern for what might now happen in Bahrain. However, power resides with the ruling family and the appointed Shura Council, and it is these bodies which must agree any legislation promulgated by the elected parliament. While there are strong arguments for drawing the different religious factions together under a national initiative, the history of the region – as well as of the religious groups, of course – does not appear to hold out much hope for this. And this will affect the attitudes of the neighbouring States that have sunni majorities.

The United Arab Emirates, who also have strong commercial links between their shi’ite nationals and Iran, have similar problems. Kuwait has been pressured not only from the same source – shi’ite have generally been assimilated into the Kuwait society in contradistinction to northern Arabs such as Palestinians and Iraqis – but also by issues relating to the rôle of women and non-Kuwaitis. Since the invasion there is some degree of normalcy returning to Kuwait – to the extent that an evening programme in English has been started, catering for lovesick Kuwaiti youth. It is noteworthy that the station manager told Reuters ‘We forget we’re in Kuwait. We think we’re in the US or Europe. The station has opened the door and taken people outside.’

Qatar appears to be holding its own mainly sunni population together but complaints caused by reduced income and constraints on liquidity are likely to increase the interests of some in moving the country towards fundamentalism, and this traditionally results in attempts to constrain the more visible aspects of non-Islamic religions and women.

Since the assumption of power by Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa from his father in 1995 there has been concern expressed by neighbouring States – particularly Saudi Arabia – for his radical policies which are making them increasingly worried. Not only has he stopped media censorship, but he talks to the press, has spoken positively of democratisation, an idea that has traditionally caused problems for both Bahrain and Kuwait, has held municipal elections and appointed a woman to a ministerial rôle. In addition he has sought better relations with both Iran and Iraq and, even with Israel in regard to an important gas deal.

At the end of the twentieth century there was particular concern being discussed in the majalis of the Gulf that the West would introduce another shi’ite State at the head of the Gulf. Protection below the thirty-second parallel was thought to be a prelude to an attempt to split Iraq into three parts – crudely this would see Kurds who hold the majority in the north, sunni in the centre, and the shi’ite in the south of the country. There is a considerable history of mistrust and worse in the Gulf between sunni and shi’ite and any consideration of the latter being assisted to establish themselves more formally on the Gulf is resented because of the perceived links they have with Iran.

It will take a considerable time for the problems associated with the West’s initiative to depose Sadam Hussein to work themselves out. Some believe the whole area to be now far more unstable than it was and, mirroring the difficulties to be seen in Afghanistan, there will be extensive manoeuvrings as tribal leaders, powerful individuals and those who wish to become more powerful and, particularly, religious leaders struggle to sort out national and religious boundaries, most of them legacies of the West’s involvement in ‘settling’ the area at the beginning of the twentieth century. The extent of demands for the creation of Islamic States should not be underestimated because such States incorporate the power of Islam in its insistence upon a just society based on the Holy Quran.

Fundamentalism – a movement to return to the fundamental values embodied in the Holy Quran – is found throughout the Muslim world and is one of the strongest factors now perceived by the Arabs to affect them. Fundamentalism appears to some in the Arab world not to be a desire to return to the purity of religion as a means of benefiting the society, but as an end in itself. Prominent speakers have equated it with fascism and claim it can only be stopped by the same methods it uses: violence.

It is not my intention to discuss fundamentalism here but, for those who have not thought about it and its effect on the Gulf and Arab world – if not the West – it might be useful to note some of the simplistic and common arguments given for its rise. These perceptions include, but may not be limited to, and in no particular order:

• the repression of traditional tribal leadership systems and structures,
• discrimination against traditional life styles,
• the accumulation of wealth by a limited number of individuals, and
• the interference by the West with the intent to support Western-inclined leaders and maintain poverty and dependency.

In the area around the Gulf this latter is seen very much as the West interfering solely due to its need for oil and gas.

Fundamentalists see the resolution of these issues as being resolved in the creation of an Islamic state, one where shari’a law governs the state and religious leaders, in their interpretation of shari’a, essentially govern the state.

From time to time fundamentalists make themselves known through their public activities. There have been reports not just of activities being disrupted but of more violent attacks in Saudi Arabia and, even, Qatar.

The home of the Holy Quran and the backbone of the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, continues to be pressured by fundamentalism. In February 1992 the King announced constitutional reforms designed to go some way to warding off criticism over secular excesses. A consultative council of sixty citizens – majlis al shura – will be able to initiate legislation and review foreign and domestic policies. However, it took until August 1993 for the members of the majlis to be named. Prior to this the King generally acted in close co-operation with the ulema, the country’s supreme religious authority. Concern for the zeal of their police, the mutawain, has led to the introduction of new laws giving the individual more rights at the expense of the mutawain. It is likely that the changes in Saudi Arabia will be mirrored both by pressures within the Gulf as well as by similar responses.

Saudi Arabia and other Muslim States are unsure how they should deal with fundamentalism which attacks them at their most weakest point: their alliance with the West. In addition King Abdullah, as King Fahd before him, continues to resist pressures from the West for democratisation. It is apparent that, in stating that his society – and those of the Gulf – are not and can not be based on western-style democratic model he is attempting to resist the arguments not only of the West but of the religious fundamentalists and their requirement of a closer reading and interpretation of the Holy Quran.

The Saudi Arabian royal family continue to have difficulties with their right to rule the people of Saudi Arabia founded as it is in their claim to be the proper leaders of an Islamic society. Difficulties with the delicate balance between the family and the Council of Senior Ulema – the highest religious body – serve to further antagonise the fundamentalists who increasingly attack the government and royal family for profligacy and corruption. More than this there is now serious anxiety in the West for their alliance with the King. There is a concern within Saudi Arabia that the royal family are out of touch with their support and the consequent move towards fundamentalism can be construed as a move towards the strict wahabi roots of the Kingdom. Perhaps, more importantly, there is considerable concern within and outside Saudi that the public finances are seriously depleted. To a large extent the State depends upon the people for support and, in this regard, the degree to which the State benefits its people is a factor in their continuing support. If this benefit falters or is perceived to be no longer generous, and if this position is seen to be due to a fault in the leadership, then there is likely to be immediate and evident grounds for dissent. Failing the ability of the traditional society to deal with this – as in the past, perhaps by the use of loyal badu troops – there is likely to be dramatic change. Leading intellectual and religious wahabi have formed a focus for disagreement, and the formation of a Human Rights group and the immediate arrest of its leaders is seen by the West as the most serious demonstration of a lack of clarity of vision for the future of the Kingdom.

Kuwait suffered from the invasion by her neighbour, having her national aspirations for Arab nationalism and Islamic identity thwarted and the conditions for Westernisation seeded. The elections held in Kuwait caused alarm throughout the Gulf as many see the dangers they foresaw now made apparent. The previous twenty-one member Cabinet was replaced by sixteen ministers appointed by the Emir, including three Islamists, and the parliament has the power to force ministers to resign. Bearing in mind the Government were roundly defeated in the elections – Government having thirteen seats in the fifty man parliament – this is likely to exacerbate friction between the Royal Family and the merchant families who are heavily represented in the parliament. It is of note that the Kuwait Islamic Movement has eighteen deputies affiliated to it. More recently women have been voting in, and voted for, in the Kuwait parliament. This has sent tremors not just through Kuwait, but through the Gulf.

The pressure for change in the Gulf is, from the Western point of view, conservative and appears to require the society to return to a more traditional status. At the same time Western observers note that there is a strong argument that those who direct opinion towards a conservative society, do not themselves have the experience of the West and its beneficial aspects, and are inclined to a prejudiced view of the West and its impact upon the Arabs. With an implicit belief in the quran, of course, there is no need to have experience of the West.

It is imperative to bear in mind at all times that Arabs generally, and Gulf Arabs in particular, are as conscious of their Arabism as they are of their religion, and that this affects their attitudes to everything they do or think about – particularly their view of themselves within the ulema. It is not a question of choice; they have been brought up to follow the directives and traditions of the quran.

go to top of page

Family relationships

With the increase in wealth, the purchase of land by the Government to benefit the Qataris, and their re-housing in estates, the close physical links between family members have become stretched. Upward mobility, education and the dramatic changes of the last twenty years have resulted in life styles that have stressed the strong, traditional family links, creating a range of problems, many of a character than have not been previously experienced and some that are not widely recognised. Material benefit is not a problem in itself, but the manner in which it is handled in a Muslim society can be problematic.

Perhaps education is the area in which this is readily seen. It is not at all suggested that education, discussed below is wrong, but it is the factor which may have created the most dramatic change. Many men now have work outside the house and children are schooled from an early age through tertiary education, both boys and girls. The hours of work and education do not coincide, creating organisational difficulties within households and, with children receiving an education which was not available for many of their parents, it is not surprising that there are the possibilities for conflict and alienation within families. This is reinforced by the opportunities for consumption, particularly those associated with recreation outside the house. However, Islam is a strong binding force and, although many of the pressures run against its general and specific premises, the socio-cultural history of the State is considered by Qataris to be strong enough to resist the worst excesses of change.

more to be written…

go to top of page

Rôle of women

The rôle of women in Islam is being continually discussed and debated within the society, much as it is in the West where, with the increasing numbers and influence of Muslims, the issues relating to Muslim women’s rôle in both Islam and Western societies form an increasingly open debate. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that, in the West, conversion to Islam is seen by women as being a means of redefining sexuality and enhancing their position within society. I should also add that most debate and criticism in the West is premised on a Western education and received standards that have neither understanding nor tolerance of Islam. While universal suffrage might be a goal for many, the speed at which it is brought about and the damage to established socio-religious beliefs cause significant distress to many.

In the Middle East the consensus of opinion seems to favour the more conservative interpretations of the woman’s rôle in placing her at the focus of the household, in the pivotal rôle of wife and mother. This is considered in no way to demean her worth but specifically gives her the critical duty of raising the children and safeguarding the family. In recent years the increasing influences of the West have caused women to look more critically at their position in society and at the influences that have created this situation. Some critics are able to see the root cause of the uncertainties and concerns of Muslim women as specifically emanating from the post-Christian West where women’s changing rôle is perceived to undermine her focal position in the family. Because of this, and as well as movements within the Islamic society itself, there are a number of countries within which a more public rôle for women has been actively pursued.

Women in the Islamic world occupy differing positions of achievement in equality with men, much as they do elsewhere but, in general, the West perceives Arab women to be in a state of eternal submission. There has been a constant struggle within the various Islamic States to achieve greater parity and, in some cases there has been perceived a real, if slight, improvement in their lot. At the end of the United Nations’ ‘Decade of Women’ in 1985 there was a general feeling that there had been a small amount of progress, but a number of delegates felt that there had, in fact, been regression. Some of the more progressive Islamic States have been able to legislate for, and achieve modest changes in outlook. Egypt, under Nasser, introduced real changes in the early sixties. Challenges from the right wing clergy were fought off but succeeded under Sadat, though today, women in Egypt still enjoy a freedom that is not found in many other States, including the Gulf.

The areas that are considered to be pivotal in determining the rôle of women in society have been focused on three issues: the

• veiling of the face;
• the public social rôle of women and their participation in social activities; and the
• activities and social rôles of women in the life of Muhammad.

The reasons for focusing on these three issues are essentially that the views of the different schools of thought tend to be reflected in these issues.

Feminist groups have tried to make an impact within a number of States but have really only been successful in struggles where they carried out a supporting rôle in liberation movements and where, once nationalistic governments were established, their support was not recognised in any real form. Instead feminist groups tend to have been absorbed by various fundamentalist movements and their general thrust dissipated. In the Gulf it was anticipated by many that the massive influx of wealth would enable women to progress at the same time that the States developed their infrastructures. What in fact happened was that a market for Western consumer products was identified and the media – led by Egypt – targeted the Gulf for articles and products that reinforced the rôle of women as the providers of the home, an idea that brought together issues such as children, food, religious instruction and the upwardly mobile good life. These media have not dealt with issues such as feminism, nor asked unsettling questions about women and their place in the general scheme of things and, apart from a few well-quoted exceptions, women have progressed little towards the Western view of a more equitable partnership with men in the Gulf.

Nevertheless, there has been change and, with increasing education and access to the West both through the media and through travel, it is only the more fundamentalist policies that may be holding back the progress that women’s groups are demanding in the northern Arab States and which, if they were to take hold, would support change in the Gulf. Conflicting with this view it seems that, provided that the men and women of the Gulf can lead a life of increasing comfort, and provided that the opportunities for women to take a more equal rôle continue to be limited, then it is unlikely that women will fight to obtain the formal settings and necessary legislation they will need to be able to obtain this equality.

However, they face in fundamentalism, a strong bar to progress. It appears to be a characteristic of women’s position in Muslim society that it is mirrored by the security of Islam. When Islam is secure, then women can be secure and confident within it; when it is threatened, then so are they. It certainly appears to be a characteristic of fundamentalism that one of the external aspects of the society, the appearance of women, is one of the first aspects to be constrained by decree, often in ways that seem harsh to the Western world. Certainly women have attained a different standing in society in different States, but this appears to be threatened when traditional aspects of Islam become an element of religio-political pressure in the society. It is argued that the control of women is a symbol of the power of men and their honour.

A characteristic of this rise is that it is funding, to a large extent, from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that is responsible for the development of traditionalism or fundamentalism, the sadder aspect of this development being that few Islamic States have given women their full rights, and both Islamic law and the message of Islam are being violated.

Finally it is worth noting that there is not likely to be overall acceptance of an increased women’s rôle in society other than may be possible in one or two Islamic States. These are unlikely to include any Gulf States though, with the pressures building up since the Gulf War and Iraq intercession within both the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, this may well change. Qatar, particularly, under the guidance of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, seems intent on altering attitudes.

Ibn Khaldun (732/1332-808/1406), an intellectual whose teachings are said to be as valid today as they were in his time, said in his Muqaddima, an early Muslim view of a universal history, that

‘Allah does not give orders directly to a person unless he knows the person is capable of carrying them out. Most religious laws apply to women just as they apply to men. Nevertheless, the message is not directly addressed to them; one resorts to analogy in their case, because they have no power and are under the control of men.’

That women appear to have no power goes to the heart of the Islamic principle that women do not have the same rights as men. In discussing the conditions necessary for being a caliph – the authority who obeys shari’a, divine law – Ibn Khaldun set out four principles that govern the requirements for the rôle:

• knowledge,
• equity,
• competence, and
• general fitness.

It is particularly in the fulfilling of the third of these that Ibn Khaldun considered that no divine mission could be ascribed to women. In consequence it is only in the fields of intellectual attainment and politics that women have been able to make any impact on an increased rôle for themselves in an Islamic society. It is unlikely that those who control religious law will be too concerned by intellectual developments – normally the province of individuals in universities – but they are likely to worry about political, popularist initiatives. There is considerable room for debate.

bay’ah is the solemn commitment Muslims make to obey, and it can be argued that it conflicts with universal suffrage. It follows that a Muslim should not participate in elections as, firstly, bay’ah is final and not, like elections, renewable at regular intervals. Secondly, bay’ah is the priviledge of notables; those who have a part in decision making and not the ’ummah – the common people. Conversely, it can also be argued that the fairest way of making bay’ah is for it to be operated through a full and free election.

go to top of page

Population balance

The lack of a permanent home for expatriates has given each of the expatriate national groups a high degree of nervousness about their several futures, and encourages greed over commitment. Although it has been intended that Qataris will continue to increase as a proportion of the overall population this is not working out in practice. There is likely to be a continuing need to import labourers as well as some middle management for necessary work, and it will be necessary for the State to deal with the issues of dependency this produces both personally and institutionally. In addition there is the continuing need to find responsible rôles in the world – Arab, Muslim and international – as well assist in settling the problems relating to Palestinians within the overall Arab and Muslim world.

So, on the one hand there is a national population that has political and administration systems and Western moraes in conflict with its traditional Islamic values and, on the other hand, a massive transient population upon whom Qataris are increasingly dependent and who, by their nature are a highly visible reminder of the way in which Qatar operates.

The same problem exists, to a greater extent, in Dubai where it is becoming increasingly criticised from both within and outside the country. The counter argument that is made there is that this is a very valuable resource, enabling on a micro-economic scale, benefits to be made to the countries from which the expatriates come.

go to top of page

Language

Arabic is not an easy language to learn or master, particularly for a European as its script and grammatical structure are radically different from European language forms and, most importantly, it is intrinsically bound up with the Holy Quran. Many of the foreigners who come to Qatar do not speak Arabic and, because of this, English has developed as a second common language due to its prevalence among the nationalities who come to the country.

To some extent this has stopped foreigners learning Arabic although many learn enough as is necessary for their work or for living in Qatar. It is understandable that the Arabic language they learn to speak is simpler than Gulf Arabic, and that the Qataris speak a simplified version of Gulf Arabic to those foreigners who converse with them. Despite this it is possible to carry out work in Qatar without having to know Arabic, particularly in technical areas where English generally is the medium of communication because of the extent to which technical terms are used.

But there is the beginning of resentment against those who do not know or, particularly, do not wish to learn the language. Qataris are right to feel that foreigners should make an attempt to speak their language and that business should generally be carried out in the medium of Arabic, but the reasons given by critics are interesting in that they generally include the argument that it will encourage foreigners to mix with Qatari society. Here there is a distinct contradiction between a stated desire to soften the barriers between national and expatriate societies, and the State’s general policies – such as short term residency, no ownership of land by foreigners, housing and rental policies and, of course, the cultural and religious backgrounds – that do little to assist this.

There is also the conflict I have heard stated between admiration for those with a good command of Arabic and the concern that much may be learned by such foreigners of the private operation of society.

go to top of page

Education

Education is one of the main areas that is likely to be able to deal with some of the problems being faced by the State in its coming to terms with its place in the world and the pressures this has brought. The wife of the Ruler, Sheikha Mosa, has been influential in bringing forward not only the education of women but the profile of education within the Gulf.

The educational system is directed by the Supreme Education Council. The system employs a large number of Arabs from other countries, giving free education to all who wish. For those who want it there is also adult education. The education of the two sexes is strictly segregated at all levels of schooling, and all education is free to nationals, including the children of expatriates who work in the public sector.

Primary schooling is broken into two stages:

• preparatory – 6 years, and
• elementary – 3 years;

This is followed by:

• secondary – 3 years.

The six years preparatory schooling is compulsory.

There are also a range of facilities dealing with special subjects. This includes:

• private education,
• literacy and adult education,
• special needs,
• scientific secondary schools,
• a language institute, and a
• department of training and vocational development.

In addition there are educational facilities for expatriates at a range of:

• private schools at both primary and secondary levels, and
• a number of kindergartens for both national and expatriate children.

The Supreme Education Council directs three institutes designed to carry forward education initiatives in the State:

• the Education Institute which oversees and supports independent schools,
• the Evaluation Institute that monitors and evaluates both schools and students, and the
• Higher Education Institute which advises students on higher education both in Qatar and abroad, and administers grants and scholarships.

At tertiary level there is some technical training available, but the emphasis is on taking students through a university education. In the early seventies, and with the rapidly increasing oil prices, the State began to investigate the possibility of establishing a University. There were arguments that this might be better dealt with

• by training the students at existing Universities elsewhere as this would be more cost effective for the relatively small numbers of students requiring it;
• it would give Qatari students the ability to learn at well established Colleges selected throughout the world for their ability to match teaching to need; and
• that Qatar should concentrate on technological education that was obviously more needed by the evolving requirements of the State.

Qatar Foundation was established in 1996 and has grown to encompass a number of facilities for students from the age of three upwards. Under its aegis a number of branch campuses of American universities have been established in Qatar.

In addition to this, an Education City campus is being developed. The intent is to provide an integrated educational environment to encourage synergy and interaction between existing educational and recreational facilities on the site and those envisaged within the new academic and medical areas of the University.

There is a considerable initiative being made on the education of nationals in Qatar.

In the event most Gulf States established their own universities and, in this, Qatar was no exception establishing the university in 1985. However, Qatar opened a College of technology at Qatar University initially catering for between 150-200 students of both sexes.

Most students achieve passes, and at the 1989 graduation ceremony of Qatar University, 269 male students graduated compared with 665 female students – a proportion of approximately two to five. A similar proportion were graduated at the 1990 graduation ceremony. By the end of 1989 Qatar graduated, in the twelve years of its university’s establishment, 6,082 students of whom about five thousand were Qataris. Most men graduate as engineers of some form or other, and it is within the specialisations of scientific research and technological development that students are encouraged to attend university. It was only in 1989 that the first graduates in Economics and Administration appeared.

A much smaller number of students are permitted to go abroad to study – for the Academic Year 1987-88 this was reported at 916 students in nineteen Arab and other foreign countries compared with the 5,621 at Qatar University for the same period. These students are following specialisations that are not available to them at Qatar University, but they must also show unusual promise as funding is given them, and monitoring and ratification of their achievements must be effected through the Ministry of Education. These students tend to comprise a higher echelon of university graduates both by virtue of their initial selection as well as by the various effects upon them of their Western education. In this lies one of the causative factors of the social division that has developed, particularly since the increase of the oil prices in the mid-seventies.

The University graduates a far larger proportion of women than men, and this is likely to cause social difficulties in the long term. It is apparent that already there are incipient social problems in two specific areas.

At present it is understood that some women use the University to extend their life outside the home. Following graduation, if they are permitted to work, they will do so mainly in the Ministries of Health and Education – Qatari women, by social custom, can not work in the private sector, and their training restricts their opportunities to many areas due to the present limits of the secondary and tertiary education system. This appears to produce two difficulties:

• a significant number of these graduates wish to be employed in areas other than those permitted them and,
• increasingly, Qatari women graduates are vying with expatriate graduates for positions within the Ministries.

This in itself is a cause of some friction within the female side of the society. In addition the available positions are rapidly diminishing and placement can then only be made by the establishment of more posts at the levels at which graduates are created within the rules of the Government; essentially middle-management. Here there is a feeling that many of the posts are not absolutely essential, and that the Government is encouraging a centre-weighted structure that will be ill-equipped to face the present and future needs of the society.

The second area in which there are incipient social problems is in the relationship between male and female graduates. It is often said – and not just in the Gulf, but in the West too – that women graduates are ‘brighter’ than the men, and this appears to be felt quite deeply by men. So much so that there has been resistance to wives being found for men where they might cause difficulties by virtue of their

• better education and its implied superior intelligence,
• the possibility that they might be inclined to defer having children,
• their wishing to satisfy their improved status by taking and holding a responsible job, and
• the possibility that their improved status might demonstrate itself in a wife more likely to be socially and economically difficult to control.

There may something in this feeling. Already staff at the University are experiencing difficulties when dealing with the perceptions to study of their female students. Partly this arises because of the way in which courses have been designed, and partly because of the way the female students perceive they should carry out course work. For instance, there have been students who will either not carry out some of their home economics practical work because they would never do that kind of work at home, and there are others who will have their servants do the work for them for the same reason. There are also servants who will not permit their mistress to do the work, insisting on doing it themselves – though there is obviously significant self-interest in this. It is difficult to be critical, however, because the courses can be some way removed from the society and its practical way of going about its business. Having said that, times are changing and more suitable courses being developed.

Female students are very much under inspection, not only by staff, but by their peers. Women students represent their families outside the confines of their homes and their dress and behaviour are daily subject to intense scrutiny from other students. In addition they are also subject to the inspection of mothers seeking a wife for their sons, and the University has become a recognised place to view and select. In primary, preparatory and secondary education, where there are 62,000 students in 192 schools, there are said to be a number of problems that create a situation in which students are not given an education of similar quality to that which might be obtained in the West, and that does not prepare the student for his rôle in the society. A number of factors combine to bring this about:

• the system of education is one imported from abroad, essentially Egyptian in character, rather than being tailored for the social outlook of Qatari students;
• the learning of an extremely large amount of information is required to be assimilated by the student;
• methodology is not a prime consideration of the learning method nor is there any emphasis on lateral thinking;
• there is little time devoted to social issues nor immediate history;
• the sizes of classes are large;
• the physical state of many of the schools is poor; and
• there appear to be difficulties in keeping order in schools.

Having said that, it is true to say that everybody now obtains an education and that the literacy rate has risen dramatically.

go to top of page

Cultural change

Elsewhere I have mentioned the problem of cultural deterioration, the process where foreign cultures slowly supplant the native culture, not necessarily to its advantage. In fact, not at all to its advantage. The problem in Qatar stems to a large extent from the process whereby many of the necessary skills required to develop the country have been introduced from abroad, bringing with them the moraes and standards of those expatriates and their formal and informal effects on the national population.

But there are a number of internal problems as well. Apart from the massive effects of travel, wealth and the media, Qatar, by making itself a touristic destination – both for internal and external customers – has established a series of standards which it advertises as representing its past. This can be seen in the architecture of the reconstructed suq, dance and music troupes and, here, in the regimentation of the great tradition of badu rider where every rider and camel has been dressed in exactly the same manner. This dilution of tradition should be anathema to the State as although there is strength in unity, that unity derives from its religion, not the trappings. This is even more true when the trappings have been introduced from abroad as has much of the dress and music of the dance and music troupes.

More to be written…

go to top of page

Media impact

Qataris, like everybody else, are subject to influence from the media. They are traditionally interested in current affairs, literature and music and a number of newspapers and magazines supply them with a self-censored background for this. Television is common throughout the region and it is possible to obtain at least six foreign stations and more radio stations in Qatar. Programmes tend to be educational for adults and children with a smattering of popular and censored foreign serials and films. Foreign productions are preferred apart from locally produced drama and cultural programmes on the Arabic language channels.

The most important change, however, has been the introduction of Al Jazeera, the Arab television station that has revolutionised news in the Middle East, as well as considerably raising the profile of Qatar to the rest of the world.

This, together with the initiatives that have brought sports and and a number of political, economic and other events to Qatar have considerably improved the name of Qatar – despite the fact that most Westerners are unable to pronounce it correctly. This raising of its profile has benefitted not only the country in the abstract but, by reflection, has given many Qataris even more pride in their country.

The influence of the media on the individual can not be over-emphasised in its importance. There is a heightened awareness of the habits of peoples from other areas of the world and, when a large and increasing amount of time is given over to viewing or listening to the media, it is inevitable that this will have a cumulative impact upon the individual.

As a consequence, rôle models are inevitably taken from the West, reinforced by the trends in advertising and despite a censorious attitude to Western moraes. This conflict between Western moraes and Islam creates, at best, ambivalence and, at worst, serious psychological conflict. The State is not easily able to help its nationals with this as it has a similar problem itself.

go to top of page

Censorship

I mentioned previously that Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa has abolished censorship and allowed and encouraged organisations such as Al Jazeera to operate from Qatar. There has always been criticism of aspects of life in Qatar from outside, but now the media within Qatar are able to articulate criticism of aspects of life in Qatar, this relating both to governmental as well as private operations. I understand that this is more prevalent in the English-speaking media than Arabic, but it is still a very different setting in which this Qatari generation is living.

Censorship is, however, a difficult concept to pin down as it is usually thought of only in its more practical sense. A generation ago all newspapers and magazines entering the country underwent a censorship process, instructions being handed down to the agents and the actual work of tearing and blacking out being carried out by a team of young boys. Censorship is more pervasive than this, though. There is always a certain amount of self-censorship as individuals come to an accommodation with a variety of issues deriving from their education, understanding of the law, social and cultural imperatives, ambitions, plans and the like. These form a base from which issues are judged and decisions made, mostly within the constraints of the law which, in the case of Qataris, are both the State laws as well as religious laws.

It seems a paradox in what appears to be these times of new freedoms, but many Muslims feel that they are challenged more now than at any time in their lives. The Jordanian poet and writer, Amjad Nasser, claims that all Arab writers believe censorship to be the most obvious problem facing Arab culture. He is concerned that culture in the Arab world struggles with impositions from two authorities: the political élites and religious movements with their supporters on the streets. He argues that artists have the choice either to agree to a number of political, religious and sexual taboos, or see their writings and artistic works banned from publication or exhibition in the Arab world.

In many ways this choice is found all over the world, but Muslims feel it strongly because of the power there is in their artistic works, founded as these arts are on the Holy Quran. There is no real equivalent of this relationship with the written, drawn and spoken word in the Christian world, and because of this, freedom from censorship is more keenly desired not just by artists, but by all Muslims. Conversely, censorship is more keenly felt when it occurs in the Arab world.

As the country develops, a considerable number of individuals have been and are being brought into the country, each having their own backgrounds, many of them completely different from those experienced by Qataris. Not only is there a general lack of understanding of the way in which Arabs and Muslims live, but many seem keen to complain about the ways in which they believe Qatar and Qataris are in error of their ways. It is remarkable that so many expatriates feel they have the right to criticise their hosts, and a tribute to Qatar that these complaints are permitted.

To some extent this might be seen as a continuation of the traditions relating to Arabic hospitality, but it is more complicated than that. Political relationships with the West are extremely strong in Qatar. This, allied to the manner in which development both physical and institutional, mirrors the West suggests that the move towards a Western democracy requires more tolerance than was practised within traditional tribal and religious constraints. This movement requires considerable changes in attitude, many of them inimical to traditional values and mores. In the past, censorship was one of the systems which enabled these values to be maintained, but the freeing of controls has had the effect of loosening the framework within which Muslims live their lives, creating more opportunities for behaviour at odds with the social codes established through the Holy Quran.

In addition to these pressures there are those which bear upon all who travel abroad, particularly those who study abroad where they live within a very different cultural environment from that which they have been used to in Qatar. It’s impossible to generalise about the way in which this affects individuals, though there is anecdotal evidence that the experience tends to polarise many, while giving all a better understanding of the normal ways of life of the communities within which they live temporarily.

In this context, a complicating, but little known or understood corollary to this is the extent to which industries have built up catering for Gulf nationals, and others, living or visiting abroad. The travel and entertainment industries in their widest sense have seen such visitors as an opportunity for gain, usually financial. This has given such visitors a rather different view of foreign societies from that which those societies might believe visitors experience, and probably would like them to experience.

So, Gulf nationals now experience, and are allowed to experience a much wider range of activities and interests than they were able to a generation ago. It is only their internal socio-religious and cultural bonds which form any control on their traditional values. It is here that strains are evident and is the field in which the difficulties with the twin authorities mentioned above are in evidence, not just by artists, but by all. This is generally not understood by ex-patriates and is, in itself, a contributing pressure on the cultural stability of the region.

go to top of page

Technology

We are in a period of dramatic change in the way in which we are employed and carry out our work. The manner in which this impinges on relationships with members of the family and friends is difficult to see, or even monitor. In the West people are having to work more flexible hours and now understand that there is no longer a job for life. Work in many areas takes the form of relatively short term contracts with no guarantee of continuation at the end of the contract. Although some enjoy the flexibililty and changes this brings, it reflects in uncertainty for all ages, particularly older workers, and also resonates for everybody in areas such as insurance, mortgages, pensions and holidays.

Qataris are able to obtain work with the Government and are, in a sense, provided with a minimum pension. They are also free to enter into commerce and develop incomes for themselves and family. While life continues much as before, work in the rest of the world is changing in response to the development of new technologies. In particular there is more flexibility in the hours worked, more women in the workforce and a greater proportion of people now working from home. Many of these trends conflict with Islam and the traditional ways of Gulf Arab behaviour. To a large extent the manner in which Government and business operates in the Gulf is similar to the traditional western models, but it is far away from many of the newer methods of business.

go to top of page

Travel

Nearly all Qataris travel abroad every year, and there are a number of ways in which they can find funds to leave the country. Travel within the region is popular as is the Indian sub-continent and the Far East, but Europe and the United States are visited by a number of influential Qataris every year.

In addition to holidays a number of Qataris are able to make work related trips abroad either on behalf of the Government or for their own businesses.

Although the State has an all-embracing medical system with advanced facilities a number of Qataris still go abroad for medical treatment and advice either privately or with State assistance, taking a number of members of their family with them to assist them in their stay.

There are favourite places to stay abroad, one of the most popular with influential Qataris being London where they can meet outside Qatar many of their friends and enjoy a freedom that cannot be enjoyed in Qatar. Regrettably they do not usually see the best of the countries they visit as there are organisations established to look after their every interests and out of which it is difficult for them to break.

go to top of page

Commercial

Some believe it is debatable if, traditionally, business has been mainly transacted by Qataris. Remember that families were dispersed through the Gulf, and the issue of nationality has been mentioned elsewhere. Fifty years ago the business of the suq was controlled by a few merchants of Iranian and Indian origin, though there were associations between them and Qataris. And there were some Qatari merchants. The main industry, pearling, was destroyed by the advent of the relatively cheap Japanese cultured pearl, the only other source of revenue being for consumables bought by a relatively poor and small number of people.

With Bahrein as its centre, pearling was a feature of the Gulf for the greater part of the nineteenth century, the Ruler of Qatar stating to William Palgrave that everybody was servant to the pearl. In fact it is probable that pearling was a feature of the life of Qatar for three hundred years and it is only within the last fifty years that this has faded despite Gulf pearls being acknowledged as among the finest in the world.

Nowadays it is difficult for us to understand the hold that pearls have on those who collected and dealt with them. There is a significant difference in quality between natural and cultured pearls, the former having a life of hundreds of years compared with the latter’s much shorter life. But their value goes beyond this. I have seen the way in which a tawwash will lovingly handle his collection, the pearls wrapped in their traditional red cloths. Each pearl is known to them and represents a particular story with its concomitant memories, not only of the individual pearl and its place in the pearling life, but the pearling songs and history, its joys and vicissitudes.

The shapes and colours have individual names and their sizes are graded using a sieve known as a tasah, of which there are twenty-five in a set, collectively known as ghurbaal. Much has been written on pearling, but a useful introduction can be read here about pearling in the Gulf. The photograph above is of a small selection of brass tasah I have, the smallest, bottom left, being about ten centimetres in diameter.

The exploitation of oil in the late nineteen-forties changed that and the first millionaires supplied materials for the development associated first with oil and then with the growing State. However, Qatar took some time to develop the international links of other Gulf States and commercial Qatar tended to rely on high profits on a slow turnover, with the prices of goods and services reflecting this, being higher than in the surrounding States. The last ten years has seen changes but the massive development, apparently geared to the Asian Games at the end of 2006 has distorted the system.

One of the main ways for Qataris to earn money in the commercial sector has been to take agencies for goods. At the worst this is exemplified by purchasing, stockpiling and selling at whatever profit is considered to be required – even if this means waiting a considerable time for the return. This system is protected in law and delays by Government and the commercial sector generally in paying its bills, has not been helpful.

It should also be noted that commercial enterprises are registered as ‘General Merchants and Contractors’ which permitted a number of Qataris to benefit from the explosion of development in the seventies through participating in the constuction industry. Without experience and with little skills, this did not benefit the built stock of the State.

There has been little successful inventive entrepreneurialism in Qatar. Most Qataris have copied friends and gone into businesses which duplicate others – reducing choice and profit. The favourite commercial front has been the showroom, and Qatar now has at least 1.5 sq.m. of retail space per head of the population. Despite this there are still identifiable gaps in the market that Qataris are unwilling to fill. At its worst, there is still considerable copying of successful ventures resulting in a rapid down-grading of those ventures unable to respond to the limited demand successfully.

The rush to develop space and agencies has resulted in considerable over-building. Structures stand incomplete or unoccupied all over the capital, resulting in funds being tied up or spent. The commercial models for this are difficult to understand.

One of the most noticeable characteristics of development has been the apparent over-commercialisation of retail activities. There seems to be more retail activities than can be supported by the resident population. The early retail centres already show signs of incipient failure as larger and more interesting centres develop on the outskirts of the town. Much of this appears to be due to the freeing of development which has coincided with the change in leadership of the State.

It is possible to see more Qatari women; they can be seen driving, they are more evident shopping and can even be seen together in large single-sex groups. There are many Qatari families who will not have their women seen out in public, but it is evident that traditional values are changing.

Another factor which has changed the way people move around is the changing of working hours. Until the mid-nineties the Government worked Saturday to Thursday inclusive. Now they work a five day week with Thursday and Friday off. Qatar Petroleum complicates matters a little. Previously they worked a five day week with Thursday and Friday off but, now that the rest of the country has changed to that pattern they take Friday and Saturday off.

Schools finish at two in the afternoon, an hour after Government finishes its work, which complicates the difficulties families already have in organising their day-to-day lives. One of the effects of this is the traffic behaviour as the men or servants of the family attempt to pick up their children from school and get them back home quickly and safely. As you can imagine, few walk to school and back.

These small changes in the patterns of family life are having a significant impression on the day-to-day relationships of the family. The differences in mealtimes is reflected in the increasing trend for families to bring take-away foods back to the family, and for the family to take their meals individually or in different groupings from their traditional patterns. A number of people, particularly young men, now eat out in one of the many outlets available to them.

Interestingly, some Qataris feel that this is a great improvement, enabling men to get away from the women – and vice versa – the argument being that women need to have time away from their husbands as, when the men are in the house, the women have to be there to bring them what they wish and do what they want.

go to top of page

Economic

Qataris pay no income tax and have a number of social services provided free for them. Their income is derived in the main from small businesses and agencies, or from working for the Government. The benefit for a Qatari of working with the Government is that he will obtain a salary, can retire on full pay after twelve years’ service, can receive a free plot of land on which to build a house, and will receive a loan to put toward the house, and that is paid back on very favourable terms. Many Qataris are able to live relatively well on their income, though this is dependent upon the United States’ Dollar to which the Qatar Riyal is directly tied.

Above all the Qatari is able to enjoy a life style that depends heavily upon a variety of services being provided for him and his family. Not only does the State provide him with electricity and water, housing and work, education and a health system, he believes that it safeguards him in the event that something untoward will happen to him or his family.

In addition he is able to run his life relatively inexpensively with the use of servants who can be brought in easily, mainly from the Far East. This works to the advantage of both Qatar and those countries supplying the labour and who receive the remittances as a considerable element of their local economies. The extent to which this will continue is debatable. The stabilisation of Kuwait after the war has brought a number of issues into more public focus. In particular the Kuwaitis’ declared intent to reduce the numbers of expatriates living there may have repercussions throughout the Gulf. Many of the houses being constructed in Qatar are difficult to maintain without the use of servants and it is also certain that many households rely on their standard of living being buttressed by the use of a number of relatively inexpensive servants.

Previously dependent upon oil and gas – Qatar is particularly rich in the latter with the third largest reserves in the world – the State has made significant attempts to diversify its economy in much the same way as has Dubai. Dubai’s rationale is that, having little natural reserves, it has been obliged to attempt to make itself a different kind of attraction in the Gulf, one that provides financial and other services that are not provided elsewhere. In particular they appear to be aiming their economy at tourism and developing their traditional position as an entrepôt between the West and Iran, the Far East and East Africa.

Dubai’s success as a business centre goes back to the nineteen seventies and appears to be based on two important strategies:

• the development of free zones for a variety of businesses ranging from finance to commodities, media and technology, guaranteeing freedom from red tape and good access to regional markets, and a concomitant
• transportation network integrating the Jebel Ali Free Zone with Dubai’s International Airport and Emirates Airline.

The aim appears to have been to facilitate travel to and from Dubai and regional offices, and to re-export goods. This is really what Dubai has been doing for centuries. In this case, however, the timing has been important as the massive development under way in Dubai is funded at a time when the price of oil has increased dramatically and Dubai has been able to suck in investment as well as prospering with the increased trade in the region.

Qatar’s economy, at the same time, has seen extremely good growth in GDP over a number of years, giving Qataris one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. Much of this has been ploughed into infrastructure development which has enabled construction development to move swiftly forward with the short term aim of providing a suitable setting for the forthcoming Asian Games to be held in Qatar in December 2006. In the longer term it seems that Qatar is, to some extent, a smaller version of what is happening in Dubai and, to that extent, is in competition with its neighbour. Many commentators believe that development in Dubai is bound to suffer set-backs at some time in the future from political and economic difficulties that are bound to develop in the region. If this is so for Dubai, it is likely to be so also for Qatar though, hopefully, on a smaller and more manageable scale.

There have been a number of moves made to diversify the Qatar economy. The basic premises appear to be to:

• encourage investment in the private sector through revisions to investment laws relating to foreign investment in tourisim, health, infrastructure, education and small to medium sized industrial projects, and
• requiring the Qatar Industrial Development Bank to find and encourage industrial and economic development projects.

Both these groups of initiatives have been made possible by the development of a number of devices assisting foreign investment with:

• tax holidays,
• subsidised energy,
• Customs exemptions,
• the ability to invest in other economic areas excluding banking, insurance and commercial representation, and
• to import the materials not available in Qatar that are necessary for projects.

The attraction of Qatar to investors has still to be seen in competition with Dubai with the latter’s relatively easier business operations, more generous terms for foreign investment and longer established development. Nevertheless, Qatar is developing rapidly, foreign investment is being made and the State anticipates that its more relaxed pace of development compared with Dubai – together with its oil and gas reserves, of course – will help it weather any downturn in the economy in the future.

go to top of page

Doing business

As this pages suggests, considerable pressures have been introduced to the country with increased wealth. One area where this has brought difficulties both within and outside the country is that related to the carrying out of business. There is a lack of understanding in the West of the traditional ways of business relationships, as well as conflict with the developed standards and legal constraints governing business in the West.

Developing countries need a wide range of goods and services, and they need them quickly. Developing countries, by definition, do not initially have systems in place to control the processes of identification, specification, tender and the purchase of goods and services, though this is something that all go through in order to establish some degree of control of their finances. The ostensible aim is to enable control, produce transparency and encourage accountability in the manner in which this is understood in the West.

The development of systematic processes and accounts is seen to be essentially Western in character and is certainly different from the traditional systems which were in place in the region for hundreds of years. Elsewhere I have mentioned these traditions which, while requiring a degree of accountability, permitted those who assisted in supporting their leaders to benefit themselves providing this was carried out inconspicuously and created neither embarrassment nor, perhaps more importantly, a power base which might lead to conflict with those leaders. However, this tradition has to be understood within the context of their having a duty to provide for others who needed or requested assistance.

This system produced a set of interlocking dependencies which requires a certain amount of ambiguity to work effectively, its key features being that the:

• movement of funds and benefits was carried out with discretion and on a personal basis, and that
• no one individual benefitted absolutely.

This last point is important to understand as although an individual might appear to be acting alone, it is almost certain that he will represent a group of people who will share in whatever profits and disbursements there may be. But they, too, will be expected to disperse some or all of these benefits as a part of the traditional system relating to tribal allegiances and behaviour in the Arabian peninsula.

go to top of page

Accounting

Despite this system, which suggests loose control, if any, of records, it should be noted that there has always been a system of accounting used by merchants to keep a track of their businesses. Accounting has been imperative to the handling of their businesses but, more recently, merchants have been lucky in being assisted by governments intent on permitting their citizens to benefit from the considerable wealth produced in and around the Gulf. In fact government policy, overt and covert, has been to ensure that wealth is shared, though to what extent is debatable.

I should add that whereas in the past accounts were kept by the individual merchants, for some time now book-keeping and accountancy have become the province of professionals from the Indian sub-continent. To some extent this has come about due to the scale of the business being generated and the consequent need for full-time control. But it has also moved the systems into more closely monitored operations based, at the beginning, with systems based on the British book-keeping methods introduced to that region over a hundred years ago. Now, of course, the systems are computerised and more easily accessed.

The scale of operations necessitated the employment of people with the requisite skills and these, as I noted, were brought in from the Indian sub-continent. This also ensured that those with a full understanding of the local businesses were foreigners and, for the most part, non-Muslims. This seems to be a general principle which I have mentioned elsewhere. While this enables a certain level of confidentiality relating to commerce between nationals, it follows that there may be a lack of confidentiality among those foreign nationals working in that area as well as the possibility of corruption, the only constraint upon any eccentricities being the threat of jail or repatriation, or both.

Government financial procedures are also accounted, monitored and relatively transparent, with the exception of areas which are considered sensitive, this being a continuing source of Western criticism. It is galling to the Gulf states that they are continually being criticised in the West with constant statements being made to the effect that they should become more like the West.

The development of the oil and gas industries has produced considerable wealth for many, some of them displaying it more visibly than others. Gulf countries are among a number which face criticism from within and outside with regard to the flow and destination of the funds from their natural resources.

go to top of page

Agents and agencies

Since the nineteen thirties merchants have sought products which they know can be sold for profit. The early oil industry brought with it the need to import equipment, machinery and transport for its development, along with housing and supplies to maintain the growing workforce. In this way the important families associated with merchants in order that all would benefit from the increasing wealth. These associations were usually informal though some became formalised only in latter years with the increase in competition and other factors.

Merchants sought quality products from the West in order to sell to those wanting to dress and equip themselves well, but also bought goods from the Indian sub-continent, China and Iran to cater for many of the ordinary requirements of the growing households. Merchants spent considerable time touring in order to identify the goods they wished to stock while suppliers both entertained them in the West as well as travelling to the Gulf in order to obtain business.

Inititally the merchants, acting on behalf of themselves and their partners, were able to identify the agencies they wished to establish but, with the rapidly increasing economy, they were able to be far more selective as considerable numbers of businessmen flocked to sell their goods and services.

In order to protect themselves agencies and distributorships were established with legal protection, though the conditions and regulations differed considerably between States. Generally merchants endeavoured to become the sole agent for a product as this was seen to produce optimal return by preventing other agents from selling that product or service.

Although Qatar has recently partially privatised and permitted some foreign commercial interests to do without local agents, it is important to note that the economy is almost completely dependent upon oil and gas, and that this is controlled by government.

In addition to agencies, joint ventures were established, particularly in the construction industry, and licensing agreements were made between foreign and local companies. All these are governed by local laws which many foreigners believe to favour the locals.

Some foreign companies have been able to buy their way out of contracts, and this has put off some foreign companies from going into business in the Gulf. Disputes between foreign and local partners have been a feature of the law courts but, generally such disputes are settled by formal or informal arbitration, regardless of the provisions of any written contracts between the parties. Such arbitration has often involved the introduction of other local parties with an interest in resolving the specific problem. This is a difficult area and one which illustrates the importance of middlemen.

And it is here that the issue of corruption tends to be most easily perceived in the West.

go to top of page

Bribery and corruption

It is a fact of life that doing business in the Middle East is difficult unless introductions are made by individuals in a position to make them. Such individuals see themselves as enablers and have access to the important members of the society. They can ensure that foreigners meet those who are able to make decisions and who can benefit from an association with the foreign interest. Embssies also act as middlemen in that they are pursued by, and pursue locals in order to be able to aid this process of foreign nationals meeting locals. In a sense the Commercial Sections operate as introduction agencies. It is in the interests of foreign Embassies to develop those links both for economic as well as political reasons, but the scale of some of the contracts developed and entered into can create difficulties. For instance, the Al Yamamah contracts dealing with the supply of arms by Britain to Saudi Arabia are being critically examined with the possibility of considerable embarrassment to individuals as well as governments.

Middlemen are usually nationals but there are also foreigners who act as middlemen though they themselves have to rely on nationals in order to operate usefully. It is not surprising that middlemen wish to make a profit from their relationships and it is here that the issue of corruption becomes an issue with any Western organisation which has a proper accounting system in place, as funds have to be found to fund middlemen.

Relatively small amounts of money can be ascribed legitimately to travel and entertainment, but there comes a time when larger amounts need to be found to provide the percentages asked by middlemen. Western tax authorities have difficulty with the issue of expenses as they are unable to distinguish legitimate expenses from those funds they would not be able to countenance legally. Additionally, many Western countries have laws specifically aimed at corrupt practices and international business transactions due not just to fears about corruption, but of money laundering.

Usually, the percentages required for middlemen become line items such as consultancy fees as it can be argued that they provide a local service to expedite the movement of goods and services, resolve conflicts, short-circuit government procedures and provide expertise unknown to the foreign entrepreneur. This may well all be true, but is unlikely to amount to the sums often agreed upon. This is one of the areas which Westerners, particularly governments, identify with corruption.

Yet I believe there is little petty corruption in Qatar. Qataris working in government are generally well paid and many have outside businesses which add to their earnings. There may be the possibility that they are able to benefit their private business through their government employment but this is unusual and would be easily identified. Eccentricities are more likely to occur at a higher level and where the system I have described earlier operates.

There are a considerable number of expatriates working in Qatar, but they are unlikely to practise corruption in any significant way for three reasons;

• firstly they will be concerned to keep out of prison for committing a crime as well as being frightened of being expelled,
• where professionals are concerned, they will be worried about losing their professional status and both the stigma and loss of income this will entail, and
• there are few government regulations and controls that might provide the source for corruption.

Education is a potential area for corruption. Entrance to the system is relatively easy as it is the intent of government to give its citizens as good an education as they may obtain. But concern has been expressed for the standards at which they qualify, the fear being that staff, who are mostly foreign, wish to maintain their positions in the country. There is also concern expressed for citizens taking their education abroad where, it is argued, educational establishments wish to maintain the links with Qatar by passing students who might otherwise not succeed.

From what I’ve written here, and what many in the West believe, it may be thought that any corruption originates within the national community, but this is not so. Much of it originates with foreign influences both within and outside the country. It has to be understood that there are significant interests wishing to derive benefit from Gulf nationals.

Times are changing and, with them, laws relating to transparency and democratic procedures are slowly being introduced, perhaps in response to the various criticisms levelled by institutions such as the United Nations, and with the resultant pressures which change brings. There are movements all round the Gulf attempting to bring a more Western approach to the way of life and, with them, increasing conflict with both the traditional ways of the area, as well as Islam. Corruption is one of the areas which is most easily perceived and criticism focussed upon, not only by those in the West, but also by those within the area wishing to maintain the status quo – or to return to the ways of a more fundamental religion.

go to top of page

Hawaala

Earlier I mentioned the practice of the workforce remitting their wages to their families in their home countries. The reason the majority of workers are in the Gulf is, of course, to earn money, usually considerably more than they would be able to earn at home. The disbenefit to them is that they have to be away from their families for long periods of time, and the conditions of work and living abroad can be onerous if not unpleasant in various degrees.

The practice of remitting wages is complicated as there are cultural and other issues relating to the methods of obtaining work in the Gulf, agents and their fee reimbursement, and the relationships between workers. Having said that, the basic method of transfer is generally hawaala due to the workers being able to maximise the amount received by their families, and it is this which causes difficulties to governments at both ends of the transaction.

The West seems only to have come lately to an awareness of hawaala, and that because it is perceived to contain a threat. For centuries hawaala has operated throughout the Middle East, Indian sub-continent and Africa as a system for the transfer of money. It is believed that the system originated in times when travelling with money was a risk; hawaala minimised their exposure to robbery and theft. The system has been used by workers in the Gulf and elsewhere to transfer earnings back to their families, bypassing the banking system and their charges, controls and records. But there is also concern that it has been used to move funds illegally, and this is the reason for burgeoning interest and concern.

The benefit to the Gulf worker is the immediacy of the transaction and the fact that he is likely to have less abstracted from the transaction than would be the case if it were to go through the normal banking channels. The hawaala broker usually has few overheads, requiring only a good reputation, security for his premises and communication commonly by telephone or email. An important point to note is that the system fits the cultural patterns of the area more closely than the more formal, Western, banking systems. It is particularly relevant in the security of family and tribal connections. In the case of Gulf workers this means that the men working in the Gulf know that the sensitivities created by having their women left at home will be dealt with properly when the remittances are processed.

At its simplest, hawaala is an honour system. Somebody wishing to move funds will take them to a broker who will give him a password. That person will give the password to the person to whom he wishes to transfer the funds. The broker will communicate with another broker instructing him to make the funds available when the correct password is given to him. It’s as simple as that.

A running total is kept by each broker with the settlement of debts taking a variety of forms. The system works on trust, and there are no promissory instruments exchanged between the hawaala brokers. Because there are no contracts, the system is not subject to legal or judicial enforcement and can, therefore, operate where those systems are weak or do not exist.

The broker can be remunerated a number of ways, either by charging a fee, using an exchange rate spread or by an exchange of goods or services. This latter system may involve the manipulation of documents in order to have the transaction cover both the goods or services as well as the repayment of the original funds. It is also a feature of the system that more than two brokers may be involved in a complex evolution of transactions. The broker is free to organise his fee or return as he wishes, varying it with the character of the transaction. A fee or benefit may be charged at both ends of the transaction but, whatever the total fee to the sender, the hawaala system is likely to be less expensive than a formal system.

It can be seen that there is a significant disadvantage to governments as the movement of funds bypasses the usual controls on them. This means that there is no possibility to monitor, regulate or collect taxes on them. Governments, of course, make estimates as to the extent of the hawaala system as there are serious macro-economic consequences of the transfer of funds outside the formal systems of the financial world.

In simple terms money transferred through hawaala is not recorded in the receiving country as an increase in its foreign assets nor a debt in the transmitting country. No revenue is derived through direct or indirect taxes and, due to the character of cash movements in the receiving country, the cash circulating in that country tends to increase. These are not small sums of money but run collectively into billions of dollars world-wide. I don’t know what this is likely to be in the Gulf. Because of this problem governments are making attempts to calculate the extent of hawaala transfers based on the numbers of workers in transmitting and receiving countries, as well as attempting to control or, better, stop the practice. However, the system is difficult to detect and, therefore, control.

Its benefits to those wishing to maximise their transfers to family, together with criminals wishing to move sums around the world, means that it is likely to continue as well as continue to be a source of concern for governments wishing to control criminal activity.

go to top of page

Development

An element of the economic factors affecting Qataris is that provided by the State’s gift of housing to all nationals. As it is extremely good value and is therefore taken up by all nationals, it is a key element affecting the families taking up the offer of house and garden, both in economic terms as well as those social factors entered upon by living in and around this housing.

One of the most significant aspects of the State’s gifting land – and, therefore, housing to its citizens – is that the traditional pattern of living is broken. Qataris who lived in a single neighbourhood enjoyed a close relationship with each other. This relationship connected both the close and wider members of the family – the qabila – and resulted in a lot of movement around the neighbourhood related both to the inter-personal relationships of the family as well as movements reflecting their commercial and religious interests and activities.

The phenomenon of dispersal following development has been witnessed in many countries but what is particularly important to note here is that Qataris continue to keep the physical linkages within their family.

New areas for development have not been made contiguous with their previous residential areas. New areas have been given to some of the qabaa’l but this is not always the case. In addition to this there has been the dispersal of Government Senior Staff to their own area in the New District of Doha. Some poorer families have previously gone to Medinat Khalifa and mass housing similar to it in other parts of the country.

Effectively this has meant that the qabila has been effectively scattered. In order to maintain their relationships there is a significant amount of driving between people’s houses, particularly at lunchtime and in the evening as well, of course, as the use of the telephone.

Land ownership in Qatar is controlled by government, though this was originally established following discussions with the main families that have laid claim to land for centuries. Access across the country is relatively easy, as is access to the coast except for sensitive areas such as near the disputed Hawar Islands which were recently ceded to Bahrain. Land, both ownership and access to, in Bahrain – a much smaller country at about a sixteenth the size of Qatar – has become a highly political issue, but it is not thought that this will be replicated in Qatar.

go to top of page

Social Services

Many services are provided for Qataris as a deliberate method of sharing the revenue from oil. All medical treatment is free. A system of preventative health screening based on local clinics is well established and there is a four hundred and fifty bed hospital staffed with foreign specialists and some Qatari doctors and nurses as well as a Women’s hospital. It is intended that the State should be self sufficient in medicine and discontinue the practice of sending patients abroad. Some argue, however, that the cost of providing this service is very high, and a requirement for patients to pay for the services they received was introduced in 1989.

Education is also free to all, although kindergarten stages are not provided by the State. If the Qatari is prepared to study within the State he or she can continue through tertiary education, though it is noticeable that graduates are now becoming demonstrators and lecturers without benefit of wider educational experience, and it is feared that there will be a spiral down of educational standards. Certainly there appears to be a concern that the present product of the University does not match the requirements of the State, but this is a direct result of the difficulties relating to the establishing of a University for a small national catchment, and the inherent inflexibility that exists in making courses respond directly to the real needs of the State over time.

Housing is given by right to Qataris who do not have houses. A gift of land and a grant for a house are given to government staff of Intermediate or Senior Staff status, and divorcees, the poor and others thought appropriate by the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Housing may also have a house built for them.

Pensions are given by right to all Qatari Government staff, those who have no income and those who are considered by the relevant committee to require it.

go to top of page

Nationality

There is a very strong feeling among Qataris for their country. Many see themselves owing a great deal to the State which has provided them with what they have. More particularly, there is a tendency to identify this allegiance with the leader of the country. In this you can see badu traditions operating with their focus on the leader of the tribe working on their behalf, and their supporting him – as long as he makes the right decisions. In this case, the right decisions are not just ones that will benefit individuals, but ones that will also establish and maintain their national place in the world. Qataris really do see themselves within a religion and a State that cradles them, and gives them the setting for their several rôles in society. I have mentioned elsewhere the concepts of shame and honour and the importance of this concept; these must also be considered with regard to nationality, pride in their country and the obligations this places upon them.

Allied to this is the independence the State must have in order to pursue its way in the world, particularly bearing in mind the differences many feel relating to the surrounding States where there are continuing political problems as the result of centuries of tribal activities associated with the problems of establishing and consolidating the mechanisms of the State.

Generally the different States are reluctant to give nationality to anybody who wants it. There is a requirement that residence in some of the States must be proved to go back a number of generations. In Kuwait, for instance, there must be proof of settlement in Kuwait prior to 1920 and there has been considerable concern expressed for the erosion of rights both for those known as the bidoon – those who should have Kuwaiti nationality but, for one reason or another, don’t have it – as well as those who are Kuwaitis. I should state that the bidoon are not just common to Kuwait but exist in relationship to all Gulf States where Arabs are stateless due to their being nomads.

Compared with this, Qatar is more generous, permitting those who have lived in the country for twenty-five years to request nationalisation – provided they drop any nationality they previously had, as dual nationality is not permitted. Having said that, the right to nationality in all Gulf countries is not as generous as it is in many countries in the West and there has been criticism from many International organisations that deal with Human Rights. Issues such as these take time to resolve. The Gulf States have come a long way in a short time to reach various accommodations with Western principles, but there is no reason to suppose that International organisations have natural right on their side. But that’s another discussion…

Nevertheless, as in many other countries of the world, Qataris know who a ‘real’ Qatari is, and their understanding is rooted in knowing the history of individuals reaching back at least to the beginning of the twentieth century.

This knowledge, together with the history of allegiances of the tribes of the area, has contributed to decisions relating to dual nationality where individuals’ traditional lands have straddled borders, giving them dual nationality. It is not an easy problem to resolve because, despite the difficulties associated with giving rights to nomads, badu generally are seen to be the nearest kith or kin to many of the residents of the Gulf States.